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Abstract
This article reflects on how the concept of regionalism has been used to explain and 
interpret Central Asian politics since independence. It argues that regionalism, often 
a norm-laden analytical category based on Eurocentric assumptions, tends to paint 
the region as “failed” and regional states as incapable of institutionalizing multilateral 
relations. In its place, the article suggests the concept of order, which is more neutral 
and—through its focus on the operation of sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, 
authoritarianism, and great power management—is able to incorporate elements of 
both the conflict and cooperation that have marked the region’s politics since 1991.
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This paper offers reflections on discourses of regionalism in Central Asia, 
which have been revamped in both the academic and policy spheres since 
Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s election as President of Uzbekistan in late 2016, which 
led to a thaw in relations between the Central Asian republics. Some com-
mentators have gone so far as to claim that “a new wind of regionalism has 
swept across Central Asia”1 in the past few years. The thoughts provided here 
link discourses of regionalism in Central Asia with a wider, overarching trend: 
1 Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, Modernization and Regional Cooperation in Central 
Asia: A New Spring? (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucus Institute & Silk Road Studies 
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the transformation—if not the slow demise—of the liberal international 
order, which is being accelerated by increasing great-power competition, the 
United States’ progressive disengagement from its previous position as “order-
provider” (although this may change with the Biden administration), and the 
COVID-19 pandemic. This analysis builds on a thorough and lively discus-
sion during the workshop “Regionalisms, Neighbourhoods and the Contours 
of Post-Liberal International Order: Central Asia in the Limelight,” held in 
Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in April 2019. There, new perspectives on Eurasian—
and, more specifically, Central Asian—politics were debated, pondered, and 
presented to a public of policymakers, academics, and students of interna-
tional politics.
Below, consciously writing in a (self-)reflexive style rather than in one that is 
more canonically research-driven, I outline my contribution to the abovemen-
tioned set of new perspectives. In sum, I argue that debates about Central Asian 
regionalism—in focusing on the failures of regionalism in the region rather 
than considering other forms of politics there—create an incomplete view of 
Central Asian international relations, and one that is often framed in negative 
terms of inability and failure. I further suggest that the notion of regional order 
should be preferred to that of regionalism, at least for now. “Order” is under-
stood here as a relatively stable and predictable set of relations between social 
actors that makes it possible for the basic goals of a given social context to be 
achieved by implementing rules and institutions that enable and protect com-
mon interests. By “social actors,” I mean states as represented by officials. This 
paper therefore discusses a regional international order in Central Asia—an 
order primarily made by and for states.2
The argument will be explicated as follows. In the next section, I will elabo-
rate on discourses of regionalism in Central Asia, highlighting their specific 
characteristics and the different ways in which regionalism is used as an ana-
lytical category with specific understandings and expectations of regional 
politics. Next, I will introduce the reader to the concept of order, discussing 
its constituent parts and how it differs from regionalism. After that, I will illus-
trate how Central Asia—which does not necessarily follow regionalist logics 
of cooperation, integration, and spill-over from below—can be considered an 
example of a regional order on the basis of specific rules, norms, and insti-
tutions. In the concluding section, I recap the argument, propose directions 
for further research, reflect on the limitations of the present work, and situate 
Program, 2018), https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2018/11/Modernization-and-Regional 
-Cooperation-in-Central-Asia-Print-V-FINAL-wCover.pdf, 5.
2 I will elaborate more on the choice of this state-centric position and its obvious limitations 
in the conclusion.
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the analysis in the broader context of the transformations of the international 
liberal order.
1 Regionalism and Central Asia
In my Dushanbe presentation, entitled “International Society and Central Asia: 
The Brotherly Republics?”, I summarized the Western literature on regional-
ism in Central Asia, finding broad—although not exclusive—consensus that 
regionalism in the region has been unproductive and limited, while the region 
itself is seen as plagued by mistrust, non-cooperation, underlying conflict, 
and disagreements.
In particular, a multitude of scholars have discussed specific “symptoms” 
that explain the very limited success of coordinated multilateralism in 
the region.3 It is not by chance that I use a medical term; it echoes Martin 
Spechler’s seminal article that “diagnosed” Central Asia as “pathologically non-
cooperative.”4 Several authors have vehemently denial the ontological valid-
ity of Central Asia’s regionalism, using words such as “impossible,”5 “virtual,”6 
a “failure,”7 or a “gloomy picture”8—or, more recently, arguing that Central 
Asia is “the region that isn’t,”9 thus negating the existence not just of regional-
ism, but of Central Asia itself. Central Asia is, in other words, either “a region 
without regionalism” or a “non-region”—what Martha Brill Olcott termed a 
3 Kathleen Collins, “Economic and Security Regionalism among Patrimonial Authoritarian 
Regimes: The Case of Central Asia,” Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 2 (2009): 249–281, https://doi 
.org/10.1080/09668130802630854; Paul Kubicek, “Regionalism, Nationalism and Realpolitik 
in Central Asia,” Europe-Asia Studies 49, no. 4 (1997): 637–655; Roy Allison, “Regionalism, 
Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia,” International Affairs 80, no. 3 
(2004): 463–483; Annette Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional 
Order,” International Affairs 80, no. 3 (2004): 485–502.
4 Martin Spechler, “Regional Non-Cooperation in Central Asia: A Pathology,” in Economic 
Developments and Reforms in Cooperation Partner Countries: The Interrelationship Between 
Regional Economic Cooperation, Security and Stability (Bucharest: NATO, 2001).
5 Annette Bohr, “Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Mission Impossible?” Helsinki Monitor 
14, no. 3 (2003): 254–268, https://doi.org/10.1163/157181403322684735.
6 Roy Allison, “Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structures and Regime Security in Central Asia,” 
Central Asian Survey 27, no 2 (2008): 185–202, https://doi.org/10.1080/02634930802355121.
7 Damian Rosset and David Svarin, “The Constraints of the Past and the Failure of Central 
Asian Regionalism, 1991–2004,” Region 3, no. 2 (2014): 245–266, doi: 10.1353/reg.2014.0011.
8 Cornell and Starr, Modernization and Regional Cooperation, 7.
9 Sebastian Krapohl and Alexandra Vasileva-Dienes, “The Region that Isn’t: China, Russia 
and the Failure of Regional Integration in Central Asia,” Asia Europe Journal 18, no. 3 (2019), 
doi:10.1007/s10308-019-00548-0.
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“myth”10—because it does not feature regionalism. For Cornell and Starr, “until 
recently, regional cooperation among Central Asian states has left much to be 
desired. Little wonder, then, that […] the very existence of a Central Asian region 
has come to be questioned.”11
Moving from medical to religious metaphors, some contemporary analy-
ses of how Central Asian states have navigated the COVID-19 pandemic have 
argued that “a coordinated region-wide response would have been nothing 
short of a miracle given the lack of an institutional framework for responding 
to a global health crisis.”12
Returning to the metaphor of medicine—what are the symptoms of the 
very limited success of coordinated multilateralism in the region and how 
have they impacted regionalism in Central Asia? The brief outline below is 
not intended to be an in-depth analysis of all possible variables that have ham-
pered regional cooperation in Central Asia, but rather to provide a general 
overview of the main arguments advanced by the literature.
First, the Central Asian governments’ neo-patrimonial nature does not 
allow for an integrated economic, political, and security system at the regional 
level.13 Since leaders worry that pooling sovereignty and diminishing the sig-
nificance of borders to facilitate flows of goods and people might have a det-
rimental impact on their control of strategic economic resources, incentives 
for deep cooperation to create a regional area of free (or even less controlled) 
movement are out of the question.
Second, regime preservation is of paramount importance for neo-
patrimonial rulers.14 This prompts them to rule out any cooperation with 
states deemed not to be fully stable or fully able to control violent segments 
of their societies, as such cooperation might undermine the ruling elite’s secu-
rity. Security aimed at regime preservation may become so heightened that the 
three evils of extremism, separatism, and terrorism become an issue even dur-
ing basic coordination with neighboring states over the movement of goods, 
the opening and closure of border checkpoints, and information-sharing with 
respect to common threats. Indeed, this reality plagued Uzbekistan and its 
neighbors during the late 2000s.
10  Martha B. Olcott, “The Myth of ‘Tsentral’naia Aziia,’” Orbis 38, no. 4 (1994): 549–565, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0030-4387(94)90164-3.
11  Cornell and Starr, Modernization and Regional Cooperation, 7 (emphasis added).
12  Kristiina Silvan, “Uzbekistan’s New Central Asian Policy,” FIIA Working Paper 120, 
November 2020, https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/wp120_uzbekistans 
-new-central-asia-policy.pdf, 10.
13  Collins, “Economic and Security Regionalism.”
14  Allison, “Virtual Regionalism.”
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Third, different levels of economic development and nation-/state-building, 
not to mention political disagreements, are arguably not conducive to the 
spirit of sustained and genuine cooperation that is the precondition for the 
creation of a working regional platform.15 The economies of Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan, for example, not only differ in quantitative terms from those of 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but are also quite different from each other. In addi-
tion, substantial disagreements over the management of strategic natural 
resources such as water and energy assets—as well as heavy economic depen-
dence on extra-regional actors that have their own regionalist projects to 
pursue—have made the idea of a Central Asian regional organization imprac-
ticable in recent years.
Fourth, much of the economic gravitational pull for the Central Asian states 
is exogenous and centrifugal—that is, the regional economies depend on the 
supply-and-demand created by neighboring great powers and external eco-
nomic partners far more than on each other’s market dynamics.16
These four conditions, while certainly not exhaustive, are indicative of 
some of the major trends found in the majority of recent Western literature 
on Central Asian regionalism, notwithstanding innovative recent attempts 
to better understand the social, political, and security context of Central 
Asian regionalism.17
That regionalism has not (yet) taken off in the region is a matter of fact, 
and the literature has done an excellent job of discussing why this has been 
the case. What is problematic is that much of this literature refers to regional-
ism as an undisputed, almost innocent category into which the political reality 
of Central Asia must fit—and, most importantly, seems to suggest that only 
through the lens of regionalism can we make sense of the international poli-
tics of Central Asia. Albeit implicitly, regionalism seems to be employed as a 
normative category with a specific yet nuanced prescriptive message, affecting 
how scholarship on and from the region is produced and, therefore, how the 
region is widely perceived.18
15  Kubicek, “Regionalism, Nationalism and Realpolitik.”
16  Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes, “The Region that Isn’t.”
17  David Lewis, “Central Asia: Fractured Region, Illiberal Regionalism,” in Russia Abroad: 
Driving Regional Fracture in Post-Communist Eurasia and Beyond, ed. Anna Ohanyan 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018); Roy Allison, “Protective Integration 
and Security Policy Coordination: Comparing the SCO and CSTO,” The Chinese Journal 
of International Politics 11, no. 3 (2018): 297–338; Anastassia Obydenkova and Alexander 
Libman, Authoritarian Regionalism in the World of International Organizations: Global 
Perspective and the Eurasian Enigma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
18  For a similar point, see Anna Matveeva, “Working Paper 13: The Regionalist Project in Central 
Asia: Unwilling Playmates,” Crisis States Research Centre, 2007, https://www.lse.ac.uk/
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This use of regionalism to assess Central Asian politics is reflected in the 
following four considerations,19 which are also often linked to the concept 
of integration.
1. The term “regionalism” is often understood as involving either a formal 
regional organization; a specific, marked, and clearly delineated (and 
hence possibly exclusionary) identity; or both. While there are many 
varieties of regionalism, accounts of regional politics in Central Asia 
often define a region as relying on a specific, exclusive, shared identity, 
possibly exemplified by the existence of a regional international organi-
zation. Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes have recently argued that “Central 
Asia as such is nevertheless one of the very few world regions which has 
not managed to establish a regional organization on its own.”20 In other 
words, there seems to be an equation between regionalism and formal 
regional international organization. Writing in 2004, Bohr lamented 
that states in Central Asia had been more focused on nation- and state-
building than “the reabsorption of their newly independent polities 
into regional organizations requiring the pooling of sovereignty and the 
formation of supranational structures.”21 Bohr further maintained that 
until Uzbekistan liberalized and engaged in negotiations with neighbor-
ing states, “the development of a pan-Central-Asian regional identity 
[would] remain a chimera,”22 seemingly assuming that a pan-Central-
Asian identity is necessary for the achievement of regionalism—an 
argument echoed by Olcott.23 In September 2020, it was argued in U.S. 
expert circles that “the absence of an institutional framework owned 
and managed by Central Asians remains a stumbling block to regional 
international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-working-papers-phase-two/ 
wp13.2-regionalist-project-in-central-asia.pdf, accessed March 5, 2021. On the broader 
relationship between policy and academic discourses and their effects on perceptions of 
Central Asia, see, for example, John Heathershaw and Nick Megoran, “Contesting Danger: 
A New Agenda for Policy and Scholarship on Central Asia,” International Affairs 87, no. 3 
(2011): 589–612.
19  These considerations are presented separately for purposes of analysis and clarity but 
should be understood as interrelated.
20  Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes, “The Region that Isn’t,” 348.
21  Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia,” 495.
22  Ibid., 502.
23  Olcott’s claim is more substantial: a common, shared identity is the precondition for a 
region itself, not just regionalism.
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coordination”24 and that “the coherence and rigor of Central Asia’s future 
institutional structures will determine their effectiveness.”25 Rosset and 
Svarin also state that “when speaking of Central Asian regionalism we pri-
marily refer to regional institutional integration among the five [Central 
Asian republics].”26
2. The term “regionalism” has often had a teleological connotation—
whether a group of states already constitutes a region or is struggling 
to do so, becoming a region is the end goal. Bobokulov maintains that 
“integration [in Central Asia] is a natural phenomenon that has its own 
inevitability, based on the geographical proximity and in many instances, 
contiguity.”27 Bohr captures this aspect of regionalism’s normativity, not-
ing that “in 1991 there was the expectation that the Central Asian states 
would follow the regionalist course” that was gaining traction elsewhere 
in the world.28 The fact that “even today there is no single body that uni-
fies Central Asia” is puzzling to some.29
3. The term “regionalism” is often used prescriptively; regionalism often 
indicates the right course of action, the appropriate behavior, and/or the 
norm for states to follow. Most analyses of the regional politics of Central 
Asian regionalism focus on the lack of regionalism, which the authors of 
these analyses find puzzling.30 Rosset and Svarin, for instance, argue that 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, regional integration in Central 
Asia “seemed logical.”31 Kols puts the case more strongly: “the path for-
ward for Central Asia must involve real engagement by their own lead-
ers. The international community should support that regional input.”32 
This prescription is often linked to a desire to normalize the Central 
24  Marsha McGraw Olive, “Post-COVID-19: Can Central Asia Be Central to Eurasian 
Integration?” CAP Paper 239, September 2020, https://capgwu.b-cdn.net/wp-content/
uploads/2020/09/CAP-Paper-239-by-Marsha-McCraw-1.pdf, accessed March 5, 2021, 13.
25  Cornell and Starr, Modernization and Regional Cooperation, 10.
26  Rosset and Svarin, “The Constraints of the Past,” 246.
27  Inomjon Bobokulov, “Central Asia: Is There an Alternative to Regional Integration?” Central 
Asian Survey 25, no. 1–2 (2006): 75–91, https://doi.org/10.1080/02634930600903056, 89.
28  Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia,” 486 (emphasis added).
29  Richard Kols, “Rising Regionalism: A New Trend or an Old Idea in Need of Better 
Understanding?” Atlantic Council Paper, September 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil 
.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/rising-regionalism-a-new-trend-or-an-old-idea-in-need-of 
-better-understanding/, accessed March 5, 2021 (emphasis added).
30  Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes, “The Region that Isn’t,” 347; Collins, “Economic and Security 
Regionalism,” 250; Kols 2019).
31  Rosset and Svarin, “The Constraints of the Past,” 246.
32  Kols, “Rising Regionalism” (emphasis added).
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Asian states, which, “under normal circumstances,” Starr argues, “would 
easily combine in a kind of chemical reaction to create wealth. But in 
this region at the heart of the Eurasian land mass, circumstances are far 
from normal.”33 Central Asia’s failure to be an integrated region—and 
hence to be “normal”—leads scholars to regard it with a sense of nega-
tive exceptionalism, seeing it as an oddity. When the second consultative 
meeting between the Central Asian heads of state in 2019 was delayed 
because of institutional changes in Kazakhstan and the need for newly 
elected President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to be installed in power, media 
analyses were quick to see this as evidence of “suspended integration” 
in the region.34 (Importantly, integration has not been on the agenda of 
these meetings.)
4. The term “regionalism” is often, albeit implicitly, used with a Eurocentric 
prism.35 This is not to say that regionalism as a practice is Eurocentric 
per se, as this would mean denying years of scholarship devoted to show-
ing how regionalism has been progressively adopted and localized in 
non-Western domains.36 Rather, the experience of regionalism—and, 
more importantly, discourses about regionalism—undeniably began 
in Europe.37 Collins, for example, wonders why Central Asia has not 
coalesced around the logics of regionalism even though “the EU and 
NAFTA are often touted by international organizations as examples for 
developing regions to emulate.”38 Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes, assess-
ing the status of regionalism in Central Asia, maintain that “[the lack 
of regionalism] does not mean that there exists no demand for regional 
integration in Central Asia, but the demand is different to that in 
33  Frederick S. Starr, “A new phase of regional cooperation in Central Asia”, Foreign Policy 
Magazine, Autumn 2004 (emphasis added).




35  Importantly, Bohr doubted the utility of Europe-based (neo)functionalism in account-
ing for Central Asia’s lack of regionalism, arguing that it is ‘less applicable’ to the Central 
Asian context. Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia,” 499.
36  Amitav Acharya, “Comparative Regionalism: A Field Whose Time Has Come?” The 
International Spectator 47, no. 1 (2012): 3–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2012.65500
4; Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston, Crafting Cooperation: Regional International 
Institutions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
37  Filippo Costa Buranelli and Aliya Tskhay, “Regionalism,” in Oxford Research Encyclopaedia 
in International Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
38  Collins, “Economic and Security Regionalism,” 249.
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economically well-developed regional organizations like the Europe[an] 
Union (EU).”39 Similarly, Boris Rumer argues that “the Central Asian 
states lack objective preconditions for regional unity in so far as they 
have neither a shared interest in a single market, as in the European 
Union, nor large investment resources from one of the member states, 
as in the North American Free Trade Agreement.”40 In other words, the 
European and Western experience is seen as a point of comparison, if not 
a benchmark. According to Kols, “the success of regionalism in Europe 
can be an important example for the nations of Central Asia.”41 It is per-
haps not by chance that the European External Action Service, in its 2020 
factsheet on EU-Central Asia Relations, noted that “the new momentum 
in intra-Central Asia regional cooperation has enhanced the relevance 
of the EU’s own experience in crafting cooperative solutions to cross-
border challenges.”42 Importantly, when the West/Europe is not taken 
as a benchmark—as perhaps in the case of less formal regional arrange-
ments, such as the Visegrad Group or the Nordic Council—other insti-
tutionalized and formalized contexts are framed as examples to imitate; 
ASEAN, for instance, has been a popular point of comparison.43 In other 
words, “there is no need for regions such as Central Asia to reinvent the 
wheel” in founding a regional international organization.44
Interestingly enough, and as some of the literature discussed above hints at, 
the Central Asian republics themselves decided to embark on a regionalist 
project based on ideas that spoke to the European experience of regionalism, 
such as supranational bodies and a common economic space, at the beginning 
of the 1990s. Not only was their first regionalist project—the Central Asian 
Union (CAU), founded in 1994—a clear nod to the European Union, which 
had been created with the Maastricht Treaty a couple of years earlier, but it 
was also supported by European personnel, advisers, and money. This experi-
ence evolved into the Central Asian Economic Cooperation in 1997 and then 
the Central Asian Cooperation Organization in the early 2000s. The CAU and 
39  Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes, “The Region that Isn’t,” 349.
40  Boris Rumer, quoted in Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia,” 496.
41  Kols, “Rising Regionalism.”
42  European Union External Action Service, “EU-Central Asia Relations,” 2020, https://eeas 
.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eeas-ca_ministerial_factsheets-2020-regional-v5.pdf, accessed 
March 5, 2021.
43  See, for example, Rafael Sattarov, “ASEAN, Uzbek-Style: Tashkent’s New Ambitions 
in Central Asia,” Carnegie Moscow Centre, January 19, 2018, https://carnegie.ru/
commentary/75308, accessed March 5, 2021.
44  Kols, “Rising Regionalism.”
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its successors provided a useful set of platforms for the Central Asian states 
to get to know each other as independent countries in the turbulent post-
independence environment, navigate the difficult transition from centralized 
to open economies (with mixed results across the region), coordinate security, 
establish diplomatic relations, consolidate strong rule in the region,45 offer a 
set of summits for discussing common problems, and put Central Asia on the 
map when foreign investments were an absolute necessity. However, these ini-
tiatives did not materialize into a sustained, cooperative, formalized Central 
Asian regionalism. If anything, cooperation has often coexisted with competi-
tion and sometimes outright hostility, while bilateralism has often taken pre-
cedence over multilateralism.
As I noted in the introduction, the experiences of Central Asian regional-
ism in the 1990s have recently been rediscovered as models and possible start-
ing points for contemporary dynamics in the region, especially when linked to 
the recent institutional and diplomatic changes in Uzbekistan. These changes 
are supposedly having a beneficial impact on the regional atmosphere in what 
seems to be a virtuous circle: changes at the domestic level lead to changes at the 
regional level, which then feed back into domestic politics. The sudden death 
of longtime Uzbek president Islam Karimov at the age of 78 on September 2, 
2016, has been followed by a series of changes in relations between regional 
states, the repercussions of which are still unfolding. Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the 
new Uzbek president, has embarked on a series of reforms in the country’s 
domestic and foreign policy, potentially inaugurating what many commenta-
tors see as a new era for regionalism and cooperation in Central Asia.46 The 
45  Filippo Costa Buranelli, “Authoritarianism as an Institution? The Case of Central Asia,” 
International Studies Quarterly 64, no. 4 (2020): 1005–1016, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/
sqaa058.
46  For a summary, see Alberto Turkstra, “Central Asian Leaders Summit Signals New Era for 
the Region, Says EIAS Programme Coordinator Alberto Turkstra,” European Institute for 
Asian Studies, http://www.eias.org/news/central-asian-leaders-summit-signals-new-era 
-for-the-region-says-eias-programme-coordinator-alberto-turkstra/, accessed December 16, 
2020; Takehiko Nakao, “A New Era of Cooperation for Central Asia,” The Astana 
Times, October 27, 2017, https://astanatimes.com/2017/10/a-new-era-of-cooperation 
-for-central-asia/; Zhyldyz Urmanbetova, “Byt’ li region Tsentral’noi Azii?” Akipress, 
June 6, 2020, http://analitika.akipress.org/news:5642, accessed June 14, 2020; 
Bakhri Bakhriev, “Tsentral’naia Aziia: formirovaniie soobshchestba bezopasnosti?” 
International Studies, March 22, 2018, http://internationalstudies.ru/tsentralnaya-aziya 
-formirovanie-soobshhestva-bezopasnosti/, accessed March 5, 2021; Rustami Sukhrov, 
“Tsentral’naia Aziia—neslozhivshaiasia integratsiia?” Central Asian Analytical 
Network, June 4, 2020, https://caa-network.org/archives/19909, accessed March 5, 2021; 
Bruce Pannier, “A New Era Of Central Asian Cooperation? Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan 
Help a Neighbor in Need,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 14, 2020, 
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discussion above hints at the fact that “while the Central Asian elites referred 
to historical events to justify the five stans discourse, the scholars who deal 
with Central Asia produced and reproduced this discourse by trying to fit the 
logic of regional integration into the five stans discourse.”47
These reflections have led me to reconsider the term “regionalism” and its 
application to Central Asia. If states do not cooperate and integrate, how do 
they still coexist? Is it perhaps that international relations in Central Asia are 
structured according to logics that differ from those of regionalism? In other 
words, what if scholarship has looked for something that does not exist (or 
does not yet exist) in the region? What if the frustration in seeing ill-defined 
logics and practices of regionalism has to do with the fact that we are dealing 
with something else in Central Asia? The literature reviewed above has the 
merit of discussing and analyzing what Central Asia is not. The question we 
are left with is: If regionalism has not taken off in Central Asia, then what are 
we dealing with? In the next section, I introduce the concept of order, which 
may be more pertinent and more appropriate to international relations within 
the region.
2 The Concept of Order
I argue that the concept of order is more fitting, more appropriate, and more 
analytically clear with respect to Central Asian political life than integration-
oriented regionalism. As argued in the introduction, order refers to a more-or-
less stable, predictable set of relations that makes it possible for the basic goals 
of a given social context to be achieved by implementing rules and institutions 
that enable and protect common interests. Aside from history-informed and 
post-positivist readings of Hegemonic Stability Theory, constructivism and the 
English School of international relations are perhaps the two traditions that 
have most endeavored to study world politics not simply in terms of anarchy 
and power, or cooperation and “games,” but rather as a social context in which 
order is continuously negotiated, debated, implemented, and produced.
https://www.rferl.org/a/new-era-of-central-asian-cooperation-uzbekistan-kazakhstan 
-help-a-neighbor/30950079.html, accessed March 5, 2021; Yi Da Jeremy Ng, “The Rise 
of Regionalism in Central Asia?”, The Diplomat, April 2, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/ 
2018/04/the-rise-of-regionalism-in-central-asia/, accessed March 5, 2021.
47  Ulugbek Azizov, “Regional Integration in Central Asia: From Knowing-That to 
Knowing-How,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 8, no. 2 (2017): 123–135, https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.euras.2017.02.002, 131.
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Following Hedley Bull, it may be said that any social context that does not fall 
prey to unrestricted and endemic violence achieves at least the following three 
goals: preservation of life, control of violence, and observance of promises and 
agreements.48 Without these, any order is unsustainable and its members can 
neither thrive nor establish meaningful relations with one another. “To say that 
x is in someone’s interest is merely to say that it serves as a means to some 
end that he is pursuing.”49 Of course, interests can vary, both in kind (security, 
economic development, or ideological objectives) and in degree (security may 
be more important than economic development, or vice versa). Yet “however 
different and conflicting [states’] objectives may be, they are united in viewing 
these goals as instrumental to them.”50
These fundamental goals, necessary to realize individual interests, are 
achieved through the observance and implementation of rules, which serve as 
normative and behavioral standards, demanding that a specific principle (or 
set of principles) be respected if social life is to prosper and thrive. Such rules 
do not have to be understood solely through the lens of legal positivism—that 
is, they do not have to be found only in treaties and contracts. Indeed, “it is not 
uncommon for a rule to emerge first as an operational rule, then to become 
established practice, then to attain the status of a moral principle and finally 
to be incorporated in a legal convention.”51
Rules can, of course, regulate a wide range of activities and can vary in their 
nature and complexity. In international relations, three types of rules may be 
defined as the most significant. First, there are constitutional rules: prescrip-
tions that define the “DNA” of the social order under consideration. The analog 
in world politics is the fundamental rule that only sovereign states are mem-
bers of the international order; other possibilities, such as a universal empire, 
a cosmopolitan community of human beings, or a Hobbesian state of nature or 
state of war have been ruled out for at least the foreseeable future.52 The sec-
ond set of rules refers to rules of coexistence, which are designed to minimize 
violence and to make the social order as predictable and stable as possible. The 
third, more advanced, complex of rules is about cooperation—that is, belong-
ing to a social order “in which a consensus has been reached about a wider 
range of objectives than mere coexistence.”53
48  Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1977).
49  Ibid., 66.
50  Ibid., 67.
51  Ibid., 67.
52  Ibid., 68.
53  Ibid., 70.
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All these rules are produced and reproduced in the workings of institutions, 
defined as a set of durable discourses and practices about what is doable, 
appropriate, permissible, and right in a given social order.54 These institutions 
are not, as liberal theorists working in the regime theory tradition might argue, 
(merely) international organizations. Instead, they are to be understood in a 
more anthropological and sociological sense, as codified and established dis-
courses and practices that define, regulate, and legitimize the social life in 
each order.
In international relations, institutions are understood as the ensemble of 
rights and responsibilities held by great powers in the international system: 
sovereignty, international law, diplomacy, and great power management.55 
Institutions understood in neoliberal terms, i.e., international organizations, 
may well be related to institutions as understood here in the sense that they 
embody, represent, and make manifest these more intangible practices, dis-
courses, and habits. For example, the General Assembly of the United Nations 
(UN) is said to represent the institution of sovereignty (one head one vote), 
while the U.N. Security Council represents the institution of great power 
management. Yet it is worth remembering that when we speak of order and 
institutions, “by an institution we do not necessarily imply an organisation 
or administrative machinery, but rather a set of habits and practices shaped 
towards the realisation of common goals.”56
Before considering Central Asia, let us pause for a moment to compare the 
concepts of regionalism and order. Regionalism can be seen as a specific logic 
of order; it is based on a specific set of goals, rules, and institutions aimed at 
fostering cooperation and advanced coordination between states and societ-
ies in a limited and well-defined geographical area. Regionalism is also a set of 
discourses, practices, and normative commitments (often based on a common 
identity) that may vary depending on the level of cooperation that the parties 
seek—pragmatic, functional, or integrationist—all carried out through the 
workings of a (set of) regional organization(s). For regionalism to take off in a 
given region, the social order in that region must be developed and complex 
enough to allow trust between the parties to foster advanced cooperation in 
some areas of common-interest concern. Order does not necessarily require 
this. Order is a more neutral, minimalist, and normatively lighter concept, as it 
refers simply to the basic structure (in terms of actors and rules linking them) 
54  Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social 
Structure of Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
55  For a broader list, see Buzan, From International to World Society?
56  Bull, The Anarchical Society, 74.
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of a given social context (in this case, Central Asia). Order encapsulates the 
basic, defining, and fundamental norms, principles, values, and rules that actors 
must follow in order to, at a minimum, live and let live. In other words, regional-
ism presupposes an order, but an order does not necessarily have to morph into 
regionalism. For the information-technology-oriented reader, regionalism may 
be thought as software and order as hardware.
It may be useful to see how order relates to the four propositions set out 
above. First, I argued that the term “regionalism” can be read as linked to for-
mal organizations and/or a specific regional identity. Order does not necessar-
ily imply this, as it allows for dynamics that do not necessarily pertain to the 
constitution of a regional group of states or a formalized regional international 
organization. Also, order can assume a variety of forms (anarchical, hierarchi-
cal, homogeneous, mixed, and so forth) that can also be studied historically 
and diachronically. In other words, order is malleable and adaptable; it may 
be formalized and rest on a common identity, but the contrary may also be 
true.57 Second, I explained that the term “regionalism” can be used teleologi-
cally, referring to the necessary creation of a region. On the other hand, order is 
always contingent and historically situated; it can be expressed along regional 
lines, but can also assume other forms and can range from minimal, basic coex-
istence to quasi-federative logics.58 Third, I stated that the term “regionalism” is 
often applied to Central Asia as a prescriptive policy indication. Here, one may 
argue that order is also a prescriptive term, as it pertains to a rational, conflict-
avoiding set of ideas and rules that may have to do with a specific understand-
ing of how politics should be done based on shared norms and principles. 
After all, “to bring order” is a normative statement. At the same time, however, 
one may argue that this is what political communities have been trying to do 
throughout history59 and that episodes of unrestrained, continuous, and wide-
spread violence are usually the exception (and themselves lead to some new 
forms of order). Fourth, I posited that the term “regionalism” as deployed in 
the Central Asian context is often laden with a Eurocentric set of attributes or 
seen as a European/Western benchmark for Central Asia. While on a lexical 
level this may hold (note that “order” comes from the Latin ordo, which means 
“disposition” and “arrangement,” but also “system” and “regularity”), order in 
the sense of a social configuration can undeniably be found in different times 
57  One may argue that we can speak of an international order without necessarily implying 
an international identity, something that vanguardist readings of internationalism would 
perhaps imply with respect to communism, democratic peace theory, and the like.
58  Buzan, From International to World Society?
59  Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the 
Study of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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and spaces, as political organizations based on rules of coexistence (however 
codified) are a hallmark of world history—not just European history.60
Having clarified the distinctions and links between regionalism and order, 
and having accepted the premise that Central Asia is not (yet) undergoing pro-
cesses that would fall under the label of regionalism, can Central Asia be said 
to represent an order as defined above? In the following section, I apply the 
theory of order outlined above to the regional politics of Central Asia.
3 Central Asia as an Order
Based on recent scholarship on the region61—and notwithstanding the fact 
that we cannot speak of regionalism in Central Asia and cannot see the foun-
dation of an autochthonous regional international organization except for the 
International Fund for the Aral Sea—Central Asia may well be said to consti-
tute an order. The institutions underpinning such an order, to be discussed 
later, are those of sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, authoritarianism, 
and great power management. In previous works, I have discerned the pres-
ence, and indeed the operation, of these institutions through primary research 
(in the form of fieldwork, elite interviews, and archival research conducted 
between 2013 and 2019), secondary research, and observable patterns of 
behavior of the Central Asian republics over time. All of them have abided by 
these institutions since independence in 1991, which has helped prevent open 
inter-state conflict from erupting and has also minimized violence—although 
it is important to stress that this institutional alignment has not necessarily 
occurred without violence, instability, episodes of power politics, and marked 
antagonism between different states in the region.
Now, let us discuss the Central Asian order following the steps outlined in 
the previous section. First, were and are the elementary goals present? I would 
be inclined to say yes. As soon as the Central Asian republics became indepen-
dent, their most pressing imperative (or that of their official representatives) 
60  For an overview, see Andrew Phillips and J.C. Sharman, International Order in Diversity: 
War, Trade and Rule in the Indian Ocean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
61  Filippo Costa Buranelli, “May We Have a Say? Central Asian States in the UN General 
Assembly,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 5, no. 2 (2014): 131–144, https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.euras.2014.05.002; Filippo Costa Buranelli, “World Society as a Shared Ethnos and 
the Limits of World Society in Central Asia,” International Politics 55, no. 1 (2018): 1–16; 
Filippo Costa Buranelli, “The Heartland of IR Theory: Central Asia between Realism and 
Liberalism” in Theorizing Central Asian Politics, ed. Rico Isaacs and Alessandro Frigerio 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 237–261; Lewis, “Central Asia: Fractured Region.”
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was to tame ethnic and territorial conflict, thereby avoiding a Caucasian or 
Yugoslavian scenario and making it possible to embark on state- and nation-
building processes without being crippled by possible conflict with neighbors 
over minorities, enclaves, natural resources, borders, and so forth. The Central 
Asian states’ governments and diplomatic officials wanted—and still want—
the assurance that no territorial claim will be made and that the basic agree-
ments on the elementary rules of coexistence will be respected. Furthermore, 
they wanted—and still want—to preserve the state as the only recognized, 
authoritative source of political and military power in the region, thus thwart-
ing any attempts to establish alternative centers and sources of power (e.g., pan-
Turkism in the early 1990s, discourses for a united Turkestan in the mid-1990s, 
and ISIS and the Caliphate today).
In terms of rules, these fundamental goals had to be (and must currently 
be) achieved through the operation of some basic, straightforward, and 
agreed-upon codes of conduct that all states are expected to observe. First 
and foremost are the rules regulating non-intervention and non-interference. 
Respecting each other’s sovereignty, preserving some sort of balance of power, 
avoiding acting as a “big brother,” and refraining from establishing a brazen 
regional hegemony: these are all rules that states understand and embrace. To 
be sure, that these rules exist does not automatically mean that they are scru-
pulously observed at all times. This would amount to an ideal-typical situation 
that is not mirrored in international relations, let alone in domestic societ-
ies; the fact that there are rules does not mean that rules cannot be broken. 
Importantly, however, whenever these rules have been broken, state represen-
tatives and diplomats have always either justified themselves for doing so or 
indicated that in their view the rules were not violated, thus acknowledging 
the rules’ existence.
Another rule that all Central Asian states follow is protecting territorial 
integrity as inherited from the Soviet Union—in other words, respect for the 
principle of uti possidetis. Observance is also demanded in the macro-regional 
context, as demonstrated by Central Asian countries’ wariness with respect to 
the annexation of Crimea.62
A third rule that visibly operates in the region is that the neighboring great 
powers operating in the regional context (mostly Russia and China) must be 
62  Emilbek Dzhuraev, “Central Asian Stances on the Ukraine Crisis: Treading a Fine Line?” 
Connections 14, no. 4 (2015): 1–10; David Trilling and Joanna Lillis, “Russia-Ukraine Crisis 
Alarms Central Asian Strongmen,” Eurasianet, March 4, 2014, https://eurasianet.org/
russia-ukraine-crisis-alarms-central-asian-strongmen, accessed March 5, 2021.
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balanced through a mix of economic and military multi-engagement, a behav-
ior the literature has called omni-balancing or multivectorism.63
The fourth, overarching rule is the preservation of avtoritet and stabil’nost’.64 
One might say the workability of order in the region depends on this rule. It 
does not really matter if leaders like each other or whether cooperation or com-
petition is the prevalent mode of social interactions between regional states, 
because leaders refrain from interfering in each other’s political domain, legiti-
mize each other’s tenure in power, and seek to minimize abrupt leadership 
changes in the region.
Finally, what are the institutions that ensure that these rules are operative, 
protected, upheld, and legitimized? First is the institution of sovereignty. Each 
Central Asian state has learned over the years to respect the others’ sover-
eignty, to voice concerns when it detects a lack of this respect, and to claim 
sovereignty to be the foundational institution of the Central Asian regional 
order—to the point, one may argue, of hindering more advanced and sus-
tained forms of cooperation.65
Second is the institution of diplomacy. States in the region communicate 
through official channels, operate embassies and consulates on each other’s 
territories, conduct meetings at the presidential and ministerial levels, strive to 
abide by a diplomatic code of conduct even during the most heated controver-
sies (such as the building of the Rogun dam), and privilege peaceful resolution 
of conflict as the preferred means of interaction in the region. This diplomacy 
and conflict management is often performed through a combination of inter-
presidentialism and on-the-ground actors—such as heads of municipalities 
and representatives of border communities—who resort to local and informal 
practices of peace-making and -keeping.66 It is these relations that construct 
63  Kirill Nourzhanov, “Omnibalancing in Tajikistan’s Foreign Policy: Security-Driven 
Discourses of Alignment with Iran,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 14, 
no. 3 (2012): 363–381, doi:10.1080/19448953.2012.720784; Nicola P. Contessi, “Foreign and 
Security Policy Diversification in Eurasia: Issue Splitting, Co-Alignment, and Relational 
Power,” Problems of Post-Communism 62, no 5 (2015): 299–311, https://doi.org/10.1080/1
0758216.2015.1026788; Costa Buranelli and Tskhay, “Regionalism.” For a recent criticism, 
see Luca Anceschi, Analysing Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: Regime neo-Eurasianism in the 
Nazarbaev era (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020).
64  John Heathershaw, “New Great Game or Same Old Ideas? Neo-Sovietism and the 
International Politics of Imagining ‘Central Asia,’” in The CIS: Form or Substance? Ed. 
David Dusseault (Helsinki: Kikimora, 2007), 237–268; Costa Buranelli, “Authoritarianism 
as an Institution?”.
65  Costa Buranelli, “World Society as a Shared Ethnos.”
66  Madeleine Reeves, ed., Movement, Power and Place in Central Asia and Beyond: Contested 
Trajectories (London: Routledge, 2012); Nick Megoran, Nationalism in Central Asia: 
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and sustain a sense of good-neighborliness and uphold ‘the neighborhood’ 
not only as the fundamental, pivotal discourse of coexistence in Central Asia, 
but also as the territorial framework for the conduct of inter-state relations in 
the region.
In recent times, representatives of local communities, border guards 
acquainted with communities living on the disputed segments of the border, 
and institutional dialogue (which is smoother in the Kyrgyz-Uzbek case than 
in the Kyrgyz-Tajik one) played a role in containing violent border clashes on 
the Kyrgyz-Uzbek and Kyrgyz-Tajik borders and obtaining foreign aid in the 
form of food, primary goods, medical supplies, and expertise from the other 
countries of the region (with the exception of Turkmenistan). The presidents 
and ministerial agencies tackling the pandemic initiated a web of contacts 
and reciprocal discussions on the epidemiological situation in their respective 
states. While multilateralism does not yet seem to be fully institutionalized, 
the web of overlapping bilateral (and sometimes trilateral) relations in the 
region is nonetheless solid and active. In a recent example, the governments 
of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan decided to support neighboring Kyrgyzstan 
with humanitarian aid thanks to the coordination of health agencies in the 
three countries.67
In addition, Uzbekistan has embraced multilateralism more consistently 
and has launched the idea of an informal Central Asian dialogue on security as 
well as economic, territorial, and political issues. This idea, dubbed in some cir-
cles the “Samarkand Spirit,” is enshrined in UN resolution A/RES/72/283. Two 
consultative meetings of the heads of state of Central Asia have sprung from 
this initiative—the first in Astana (now Nur-Sultan) in 2018 and the second 
in Tashkent in 2019. Alongside these informal meetings, foreign affairs issues 
are also back on the radar, with Central Asian foreign ministers now meeting 
regularly after more than a decade of intermittent, haphazard dialogue. The 
purpose of this flexible, adaptable, non-committal, and pragmatic dialogue is 
for Central Asian states to update each other on issues relevant to systemic 
aspects of regional politics. Cooperation has become voluntary, consensual, 
and informal. Yet contemporary analysts of these dynamics still dismiss them 
as “confabbing,” “flowery language,” “chatter,” and “boilerplate statements.”68
A Biography of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Boundary (Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2017).
67  Pannier, “A New Era of Central Asian Cooperation?”
68  “Central Asia Leaders Confab but Stop Short of Binding Commitments,” EurasiaNet, 
March 16, 2018, https://eurasianet.org/central-asia-leaders-confab-but-stop-short-of 
-binding-commitments, accessed March 5, 2021.
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International law is the third institution upholding order in the region. UN 
treaties and conventions are invoked and adopted, especially when it comes 
to territorial matters, security issues, and management of natural resources. A 
good example is the oft-neglected Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone 
and the preparatory work behind its creation.69 Treaties, memoranda, proto-
cols, and conventions are used, signed, and ratified—yet flexibility, informal-
ity, and non-binding “soft” tools of agreement such as broad discussions and 
verbal agreements are also in play. At the regional level, in recent years, mul-
tilateral agreements and regional conventions have been almost purposefully 
avoided, as regional leaders are focusing more on a behavioral code of conduct 
based on consensus and flexibility than on binding agreements. A mix of for-
malized and informal relations between the regional states thus helps consti-
tute the backbone of coexistence and cooperation in Central Asia. As Uzbek 
president Shavkat Mirziyoyev recently argued, Central Asian presidents meet 
and discuss not to institutionalize a new regional organization, but merely to 
“sync their watches.”70
Fourth, there is authoritarianism. The institutionalization of authoritari-
anism, often linked to seniority and paternalism—as evidenced by the hon-
orific titles bestowed on Central Asian presidents—has been progressively 
legitimized in the region through the adoption of strong rule and authori-
tarian practices by the Central Asian states, on the one hand, and the dele-
gitimization of alternative, more pluralistic forms of government whenever 
these have been pursued, on the other hand. The 2005 and 2010 revolutions 
in Kyrgyzstan are an example of delegitimization,71 which has served almost 
as an exclusion from a club of like-minded states. This meshes with the defini-
tion of “institution” provided above, which stresses both regulatory practices 
and the definition of identities and membership criteria within a specific 
social group. The authoritarian governance widely adopted in the region, its 
acceptance by regional states (granted, with marked differences within each 
state), and the shared understanding that instability in a country is a potential 
threat to rule (and the ruler) in other regional states points to the plausible 
existence of a raison de système (as opposed to a realist raison d’état), which is 
typical of a social context structured as an order. Recent work on illiberal and 
69  Nuria Kutnaeva, The Political Aspect of the Formation of a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free 
Zone (Bishkek: Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library, 2013), https://www.prlib.ru/en/item/ 
694644; Cornell and Starr, Modernization and Regional Cooperation.
70  “Central Asia Needs Joint Search for Solutions to Regional Problems—Mirziyoyev,” Central 
Asia General Newswire, November 10, 2017, accessed through LexisNexis on June 29, 2020.
71  The fine-grained institutionalization of authoritarianism in Central Asia is accounted for 
in Costa Buranelli, “Authoritarianism as an Institution?”.
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authoritarian peacebuilding in the region has also considered these practices’ 
structuring effects.72
Finally, there is the institution of great power management. This institution 
is the set of practices, discourses, and ideas that allow great powers to take 
over responsibilities in the face of (perceived or real) existential threats to the 
Central Asian order, grounded mostly in these great powers’ capabilities, spe-
cial rights, and responsibilities. No Central Asian state, for example, disputes 
the fact that Russia (as well as, perhaps to a lesser extent, the US) is allowed to 
and in fact must keep the situation in Afghanistan in check. Yet it is clear that 
this institution is in tension with that of sovereignty, as great power manage-
ment may easily slide into violations of the sovereign prerogatives of regional 
states. As Nazarbayev has recently argued,
Of course, we [Central Asian states] all have two big partners and neigh-
bors: Russia and China. We will always work together with them. All of 
our agreements remain in force, despite the fact that some of our coun-
tries are EurAsEC [Eurasian Economic Community] members, some 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) members, and some not, 
but that’s not what matters. However, we should resolve our own issues 
without involving third parties.73
A recent example of (attempted) great power management occurred in rela-
tion to the border issues I mentioned when discussing diplomacy’s role in 
the Ferghana valley. At a recent meeting of CSTO delegates, Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov suggested Russia as a mediator between Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, as well as declaring Moscow’s readiness to play bona officia in the 
demarcation of borders. Paradoxically, and perhaps ironically, Lavrov’s offer 
managed to put the two conflicting parties on the same page: both Bishkek 
and Dushanbe rejected Russia’s involvement in the border question, argu-
ing that this was a sovereign prerogative of the two states and that an offer 
of mediation would constitute interference in the internal affairs of the two 
countries.74 Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s reaction to Russia’s offer, as well as 
72  For example, David Lewis, John Heathershaw, and Nick Megoran, “Illiberal Peace? 
Authoritarian Modes of Conflict Management,” Cooperation and Conflict 53, no. 4 (2018): 
486–506, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836718765902.
73  Central Asia General Newswire, “Central Asia Needs Joint Search.”
74  “Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry Replied to Lavrov’s Statement over Readiness of Russia to help 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan to Settle Border Issue,” Akipress, May 30, 2020, https://m.akipress 
.com/news:642578:Kyrgyz_Foreign_Ministry_replied_to_Lavrov_s_statement_over 
_readiness_of_Russia_to_help_Kyrgyzstan,_Tajikistan_settle_border_issues/, accessed 
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Moscow’s recent attempts to navigate the delicate political dynamics in the 
region, confirm recent research findings on the negotiated nature of Moscow’s 
hegemony in the region, which is fundamentally dependent on the Central 
Asian countries’ consent and never amounts to mere primacy.75
Not only have the workings of the above institutions preserved Central Asia 
from descending into open conflict and becoming a regional Hobbesian state 
of nature, but they have also created the conditions for better coordination, 
pragmatic coexistence, flexible cooperation, and informal consultations—
implemented in a cautious way and sometimes marked by disagreements and 
conflict, yet stable and accepted by all parties involved.76
In sum, the discussion above suggests the existence of an order in Central 
Asia that very much depends on the states’ presidents’ agreement to avoid open 
conflict and competition, as these may lead to instability and, consequently, to 
their loss of personal power and the potential for exploitation by neighboring 
great powers. This order is premised on the values of preservation of (politi-
cal) life, control of violence, and respect of agreements, and it is sustained by 
the institutions of sovereignty, diplomacy, authoritarianism, international law, 
and great power management—a very state-centric, elite-based consensus 
that arguably privileges the inter-state domain over the inter-human one by 
fostering what has been called an illiberal peace.77
What about the place of Central Asian order in the macro-regional envi-
ronment? This order is institutionally and normatively supported by a com-
plex set of formal regional organizations. These organizations—the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization, among others—facilitate dialogue 
between Central Asian governments by providing venues for discussing mat-
ters of common concern and by locking in specific values and principles that 
March 5, 2021; “Tajikistan Sends Note to Russian Foreign Ministry on Lavrov’s 
Statement About Tajik-Kyrgyz Border,” Akipress, June 1, 2020, https://akipress.com/ 
news:642621:Tajikistan_sends_note_to_Russian_Foreign_Ministry_on_Lavrov%E2%80% 
99s_statement_about_Tajik-Kyrgyz_border/, accessed March 5, 2021.
75  Filippo Costa Buranelli, “Spheres of Influence as Negotiated Hegemony—The Case of 
Central Asia,” Geopolitics 23, no. 2 (2018): 378–403, https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2017 
.1413355.




77  Catherine Owen et al., Interrogating Illiberal Peace in Eurasia: Critical Perspectives on 
Peace and Conflict (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).
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underpin the above institutions.78 The reader may argue that the norms and 
institutions embodied in these organizations, especially sovereignty, diplo-
macy, and international law, facilitate interactions between most states across 
the world, and certainly in the macro-regional setting encompassing Eurasia 
and South Asia, and thus are not exclusively ‘Central Asian’. And yet, one can 
nonetheless recognize a ‘Central Asian’ regional order in the minds of lead-
ers and officials. Here is where discursive, rhetorical politics has its importance, 
and where the way in which élites talk and relate to their neighbors consti-
tutes and constructs the regional environment. The use of ‘Central Asia’ as a 
shared imagined space that binds together the regional states keeps dialogue 
alive; creates a sense of belonging; stresses commonalities that are cultural, 
historical, and religious; and places the republics on the international map—
useful for issues pertaining to development, environmentalism, and security. 
Several things markedly delimit Central Asia to the five post-Soviet republics, 
including the most recent consultative meetings of the Central Asian Heads 
of States and the initiatives that followed (such as the boosting of cultural 
diplomacy to facilitate trust-building and people-to-people linkages), as well 
as the statement released during the October 2020 events in Kyrgyzstan.79 
Adopting order as an analytical lens to study Central Asian politics also 
makes it possible to account for Turkmenistan, something that a regionalist 
approach cannot do, given Ashgabat’s insistence on isolationism and “posi-
tive neutrality.”80 Furthermore, periodic attempts on the part of Uzbekistan to 
include Afghanistan in the regional complex—especially through participa-
tion in the peace-making process there—seem to be more part of Uzbekistan’s 
wider strategy for taking ownership of the process than a genuine redefini-
tion of the regional contours of Central Asia, although this may well change 
in the future. Simultaneously, recent scholarship has shed light on how the 
Central Asian republics instrumentally and tactically play at different regional 
tables and deploy different identities to fend off great power pressure and the 
78  Alessandra Russo and Edward Stoddard, “Why Do Authoritarian Leaders Do Regionalism? 
Ontological Security and Eurasian Regional Cooperation,” The International Spectator: 
Italian Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 3 (2018): 20–37, https://doi.org/10.1080/0393
2729.2018.1488404.
79  Tatyana Kudryavtseva, “Presidents of Four Republics Make Appeal on Situation in 
Kyrgyzstan,” 24.kg, October 9, 2020, https://24.kg/english/168557_Presidents_of_four 
_republics_make_appeal_on_situation_in_Kyrgyzstan/, accessed March 5, 2021.
80  This is epitomized by Rosset and Svarin, quoting Bohr: “In this article, however, we exclude 
Turkmenistan from the discussion because the country followed a firmly isolationist path 
and ‘has set itself apart from the phenomenon of regionalism altogether.’” See Rosset and 
Svarin, “The Constraints of the Past,” 246.
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encroachments of power politics.81 Thus, the concept of order presented in 
this paper should not be interpreted as too rigidly exclusionary.
Before concluding this section, I offer two additional thoughts to further 
clarify what the concept of order as employed here means and entails. First, 
the fact that there is an order does not mean that there is an absence of dis-
agreement, conflict, or violence. Central Asia is often a theatre of skirmishes 
and quarrels, both at the state level (as with the recent and protracted hurdles 
and reciprocal accusations on the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border with respect to the 
free transit of goods and commercial vehicles) and the people-to-people level 
(the aforementioned border conflicts). Simply, the fact that there is an order 
means that there is a set of rules and thresholds and that all players (states) 
understand that it is in their interest not to violate them constantly—for the 
viability of their political project depends not on the raison d’état, as a realist 
would maintain, but on a shared raison de système. As for conflict, competition, 
and episodes of violence, these are common to all social contexts (from fami-
lies to large-scale societies) and their presence should be no surprise. Should 
they become pervasive and uncontrolled, though, that would mean the col-
lapse of a given order. This is what the literature on (the absence of) regional-
ism in Central Asia has often emphasized and perhaps over-emphasized: it has 
mostly stressed the presence of conflict, competition, frictions, and disagree-
ments, as well as the lack of formalized structures for cooperation, a focus 
that has cast a shadow on other, more basic and yet fundamental patterns of 
relations and coexistence between the Central Asian republics. Order is never 
fixed but is always negotiated, contested, produced, and reproduced through 
discourses and practices at different levels.
Second, the fact that order as depicted above is very much state-centric and 
dependent on an inter-elite understanding of stability and predictability does 
not necessarily mean that non-state actors are excluded from it; this is a spe-
cific methodological choice I consciously adopt in this paper, but this does 
not mean that it is a priori exclusionary. In fact, as noted when analyzing the 
operation of diplomacy in the region, local and border communities are very 
much involved in maintaining stability and peace in the most sensitive areas, 
often thanks to rules and practices that may have nothing to do with interna-
tional law but are more rooted in local and precolonial sources of legitimacy 
and acceptance. Moreover, dialogue between intellectuals, scholars, and ana-
lysts on Central Asia’s status—carried out in seminars, roundtables, media 
81  Aliya Tskhay and Filippo Costa Buranelli, “Accommodating Revisionism through 
Balancing Regionalism: The Case of Central Asia,” Europe-Asia Studies, 72, no. 6 (2020): 
1033–1052, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1779184.
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appearances, and research centers—also favors a discourse of togetherness 
that, if not fully manifested in regionalist and integrationist logics, nonetheless 
underpins a sense of order and good-neighborliness. The Central Asian order 
depicted in this paper is a complex, multi-layered one with different world-
views and imaginaries. The state-centric approach of this paper is one way to 
look at it, but arguably not the only way.
4 Final Reflections and Further Research
My thoughts presented above on the constitution and operation of the Central 
Asian order are intended to make an initial, suggested, and tentative case for 
seriously considering the presence of dialogue, common understandings, and 
“red lines” between Central Asian states even in the absence of regionalist and 
integrationist dynamics.
The concept of order, more basic and less normatively burdensome than 
that of regionalism, seems to be more faithful to what is happening in the 
region, both from a discursive and a pragmatic viewpoint, especially when rely-
ing on what anthropologists would call emic accounts of political life—that is, 
when discourses and practices make sense and have purposeful social value 
and legitimacy for the actors immersed in the context of study. Regionalist 
and integrationist impulses from the early and mid-1990s have yielded ground 
to discourses centered on coordination, mutual listening, compromise, and 
pragmatism, rather than aspirational designs of institutionalized multilateral-
ism. Given the underlying distrust between governments in the region, at least 
until a couple of years ago, this should be interpreted as a welcome result. A 
focus on order also helps us understand that the absence of purely Central 
Asian regional organizations or the fact that membership in other platforms 
is shared with neighboring great powers is not necessarily a failure of Central 
Asian regionalism but rather is a practice of order-making and order mainte-
nance in itself. Adopting order as an analytical category to describe Central 
Asia and its political life does not, however, mean completely ruling out the 
concept of regionalism, assuming it is interpreted in a non-formalized way. In 
fact, new literature on informal and “fringe” regionalism has made the case for 
escaping the Eurocentric trap of formality and looking at actual practices of 
cooperation and multilateral interaction, taking into account different levels 
of analysis.82 In my assessment, this form of regionalism may still find fertile 
82  Frank Mattheis, Luca Raineri, and Alessandra Russo, Fringe Regionalism: When 
Peripheries Become Regions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Pivot, 2018); Kairat Moldashev and 
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ground in Central Asia. Yet this present time is probably one of consolidating 
the rules of coexistence and finding ways to make them fully predictable; as 
such, speaking of order seems to be more accurate and perhaps preferable. By 
focusing on order, we as scholars can dig out the fundamental principles that 
would define the backbone of any regionalist enterprise, which will be clear to 
us only after having understood and interpreted the underlying norms, institu-
tions, and interpretations thereof that are at play in Central Asia.
These reflections should be tied to broader considerations about what the 
future of the international liberal order (if indeed it has one) entails. If the 
international liberal order is receding and a more pluralistic, region-based 
order is rising,83 then it is reasonable to expect regions to maintain their fun-
damental ties to the global level (especially the market and trade structure of 
the global economy) while at the same time cultivating embedded pluralism84 
revolving around local institutions and indigenous interpretations of global 
ones such as sovereignty and international law. As discussed above, this can be 
done through a mix of formality and informality, or through the institutional-
ization of practices that are absent from the liberal, Western world (as in the 
case of strong rule). But there may be other ways to achieve this, which brings 
me, however briefly, to possible trajectories for further research.
I hint at three possible trajectories. First, works on Central Asian order may 
genuinely benefit from sociological and anthropological studies on bottom-up 
cooperation and cross-border interactions in the region. International Relations 
has an advantage in being prone to interdisciplinarity, but the field rarely goes 
for it. A focus on order, combined with these arguments, may well shed light 
on how people in the region reproduce and uphold (as well as challenge and 
reframe) the workings of specific norms, principles, and institutions; it may 
also contribute to defining and negotiating intersections between national 
and regional forms of identity, neighborliness, and togetherness. This research 
Ikboljon Qoraboyev, “From Regional Integration to Soft Institutionalism: What Kind of 
Regionalism for Central Asia?” in Integration Processes and State Interests in Eurasia, 
ed. Jildiz Nicharapova and Sebastien Peyrouse, conference proceedings of annual inter-
national conference American University of Central Asia (Bishkek, June 11, 2018), 83–97, 
available at https://research.auca.kg/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2017/10/Integration 
-Processes-and-State-Interests-in-Eurasia.pdf.
83  For an overview, see Amitav Acharya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional 
Worlds,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 4 (2014): 647–659, https://doi.org/10.1111/
isqu.12171; and Giovanni Barbieri, “Regionalism, Globalism and Complexity: A Stimulus 
Towards Global IR?” Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 4, no. 6 (2019): 424–441.
84  Barry Buzan and Laust Schouenborg, Global International Society—A New Framework of 
Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
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trajectory would have the merit of moving the conception of order outlined 
in this paper from a state-centric perspective to a human, society-based one.
Second, given that Central Asian order does not exist in a vacuum but insists 
on a wider substratum of rules and norms linking all states together, studies 
suggesting that the legitimacy of international institutions should always be 
studied and contextualized in the regional context may show that understand-
ing the norms, goals, and principles of Central Asian order is pivotal if meaning-
ful cooperation is to be fostered between Western international organizations 
and Central Asian governments, as it is through processes of contextualization 
and localization that the international can work in and with the local.85
Third—and once again venturing into interdisciplinary terrain—scholars 
should conduct more research on whether local and precolonial understand-
ings of social order and collective management of the political space (the 
region) are to be found in the discourse and practices of state representatives 
and of those non-state actors involved in the replication of order-making 
actions.86 This would require a much-needed process of epistemic decolo-
nization and an uncovering of local agency and meaning-making, for exam-
ple, by relying more on the work of scholars from the region and on more 
grounded context-embeddedness. From an epistemological perspective, this 
would imply a move from positivism to interpretivism and thick-descriptive 
approaches to the politics of the region to uncover and make intelligible the 
meaning and purpose of local discourses and practices. This would allow us 
to gain a more genuine and authentic understanding of how local interpreta-
tions and contestations of liberal principles of political organization feed back 
into weakening logics of the international liberal order, perhaps providing a 
sharper account of how Central Asia may find its way in a global framework of 
international relations.
85  Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); 
see also Assylzat Karabayeva, “Leaders, Ideas, and Norm Diffusion in Central Asia and 
Beyond,” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics (December 6, 2019).
86  Timur Dadabayev and John Heathershaw, “Central Asia: A Decolonial Perspective on 
Peaceful Change,” in The Oxford Handbook of Peaceful Change in International Relations, 
ed. T.V. Paul et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).
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